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Taxation: Needs, Limitations, and Possibilities
IN WARTIME the exigencies of the military situation deter-
mine an unusually high proportion of official decisions con-
cerning the amount and kinds of public expenditure, but
the expenditures can be financed by various methods or com-
binations of methods. We have seen in Chapters 4 and 6 that
total federal expenditures, defense and non-defense com-
bined, must, as a practical matter, be met by tax revenues
plus borrowed funds.
The federal budget, submitted in January 1942 for the
fiscal year ending June 30, 1943, called for total expenditures
of about $62 billion, including aboutbillion to finance
net war outlays of certain government corporations,
billion budgeted for war purposes, and $6 billion for other
items. An additional billion to transfer obligations from
government corporations to the Treasury can presumably
be covered by a refunding operation not essentially different
from that which replaces maturing direct obligations of the
Treasury by new Treasury securities, and does not, therefore,
represent any new funds. Accordingly, the total new funds
required to finance the 1943 budget amount to about $62
billion.
The war program has expanded very rapidly since the
Pearl Harbor attack; and the figures of the January Budget
Message were superseded by revised figures in a press release
by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, dated April
24, 1942. There the significant change is an increase in the
budgeted war expenditures fromto $67 billion. With the
i68TAXATION: NEEDS, ETC. 169
itemsof $6 billion for other expenditures and $3 billion for
Treasury financing of war outlays by government corpora-
tions unchanged, the resulting total of new funds required
for the fiscal year 1943 is raised from $62to$76 billion.
Although still further expansion has taken place, and will
probably continue, in the program of war expenditures, and
although some of these further expenditures may be made
in the fiscal year 1943,. the analysis here is based upon the
revised budget estimates of April 24 as the most recent official
summary of the entire budget outlook.
Chapter 6 gives brief attention—further analysis appears
in the Appendix—to possible cuts, beyond those indicated
by the budget, in non-military expenditures as a means of
reducing the grand total of $76 billion. Possibilities in this
direction, while important, are not very large; and the maxi-
mum reduction which can be achieved is unlikely to exceed
$i billion. Hence, the total funds which must be secured,
to meet the scale of expenditures provided by the revised
1943budgetafter possible further cuts in non-defense items,
run to about $75 billion.
Chapter 6 showed that various considerations of public
policy may justify raising about $20 billion of the billion
needed by borrowing, and that considerably more borrowing
can probably be handled without inflationary consequences.
This leaves some $55 billion as one tentative goal of a tax
program for the fiscal year 1943, with the possibility that it
can be substantially lower, perhaps as low as $4o-45 billion
without necessitating inflationary borrowing. As estimates of
tax revenues for the fiscal year 1943,onthe basis of laws 'in
effect at the time of the estimate, total about $i8 billion
(revised budget figures of April 24), the goal for new taxes
ranges from roughly $22 to $37 billion.
This and the next chapters examine means of progressing
toward the tax goal' of $22 billion; they do not outline any
single tax program as more clearly adapted than others to
meeting the needs of the case. Instead they analyze all the170 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
important elements, so far as we have discovered them, of a
feasible program. Among these elements are different types
of tax, different rate schedules for various taxes, different
provisions as to exemption or other amelioration, different
modes of collection. Each element is examined in terms of
its probable effect on revenue yield and of its capacity to
meet the basic wartime economic objectives discussed in pre-
ceding chapters. Each is examined also with respect to its
probable or foreseeable effects, economic or other, because
their consideration will of necessity influence public choice
as to which elements should be incorporated into a tax pro-
gram. Unless we have overlooked important elements, the
tax program Congress will adopt will be made up of some
of and perhaps all the elements discussed, in some combina-
tion that will be arrived at by that rough balancing of con-
flicting considerations that marks the legislative process. We
do not attempt to predict what combination will be arrived
at by this process, or to demonstrate that some one combina-
tion is the best. We do, however, try to make clear that
some combinations that might be devised on paper are not
practicable; for example, a heavy sales tax would seek to
tap the same section of income as a heavy low bracket income
tax collected at the source. The feasible combinations of the
elements are not numerous. We give some examples, with-
out suggesting that any one is clearly preferable. Never-
theless, some among the combinations and some kinds of
taxes are especially adapted to meeting the needs of the
Situation, with special reference to the absorption of that
excess of consumer and other civilian incomes capable of
inducing price inflation. Chapters 2 and 3 have shown that,
as a result of the war program the money incomes of enter-
prises and individuals are being enlarged and at the same
time the supply of civilian goods is being restricted. The
resultant excess of civilian incomes available for spending
is distributed between enterprises on the one hand and in-
dividual consumers on the other, and among individualsTAXATION: NEEDS, ETC. 171
according to the size of their incomes, in a manner that can
be at least roughly estimated. The estimates developed in
these earlier chapters furnish a rough guide to the selection
of tax policies which will absorb income at the necessary points
in the whole economy, as well as the needed aggregate for
the whole economy.
Chapter 3 sets forth that, at a level of income payments of
$109 billion, the aggregate sums in the hands of individuals
for savings and taxes would probably amount to $48 billion.
Of this amount, some $14 billion would accrue to the in-
come group above $10,000, about $31 billion to the $1,750-
10,000 group, and about billionto the group under
$1,750. This probable distribution of unspent income has an
important bearing upon the program of war finance, and in
particular suggests that tax and borrowing policies will need
be directed especially at the middle of these three broad
income groups.
This chapter is a general treatment of the tax problem;
the needs for new taxes are outlined in the light of expected
revenue yields of existing taxes, the salient characteristics
of the existing tax structure are set forth and its chief de-
fects as a means of serving wartime economic objectives
noted; the main policy considerations that will guide the
selection of new taxes are listed, and their place in the anal-
ysis developed in this book indicated; and the range of tax
changes, examined in detail in later chapters, is summarized.
1 THE PRESENT TAX SYSTEM
Formulating a huge tax program is not simply a matter of
obtaining cash for the Treasury. Heavy taxes have far reach-
ing economic and other effects that may or may not assist
in the attainment of basic objectives of economic policy
under an armament program and such other objectives as
are recognized as desirable even in wartime. Hence a pre-
scription for taxation that hopes to achieve satisfactory re-172 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
suits must be written with these broader consequences in
mind.
To clear the ground for consideration of those questions of
policy, we examine the tax system now in effect. Table 14
summarizes the kinds and the relative importance of the
taxes collected during the fiscal year ended June 1939,
the last to be completed before the outbreak of World
War II; the year ended June 30, 1941, reflecting in part the
two revenue acts passed in 1940, the latest fiscal period for
which data on actual collections are available; and the most
TABLE 14
Federal Tax Revenues, 1939, 1941, 1942, 1943
(billions of dollars)
FISCAL YEAR
1939ft 1941b 1942 1943 C
Esti- Esti-
% of % ofmated % ofmated % of
SOURCE Amount totalAmount totalamount totalamount total
Corporation
taxes 1.3 23 2.2 29 4.2 6.7
Individual income
taxes i.o 19 1.4 i8 3.2 25 5.0 28
Estate & gift taxes .4 7 .4 5 .5 4 .5 3
Excises i.8 32 2.4 31 3.1 25 3,4 19
Social security taxes 13 .9 12 1.2 10 i.8 10
Customs 6 .4 5 .4 3 .3 2
Total 5.5 7.8 12.6 17.8
Totals do not exactly check, because of rounding of figures.
Compiled from
aTreasuryDepartment Bulletin, Sept. 1941, pp. 4, 40.
bIbid.,pp. 4, 40, 42.
Budget of issued in January 1942. We have roughly apportioned
budget figures for back taxes between corporations and individuals, and have
estimated small increases in separate items to bring the total up to the
revised budget figure of April 24, 1942. Actual figures for the full fiscal. year
1942, from Daily Treasury Statement of June 1942, show total revenues
of $13.4billion,including (all in billions): income tax (both corporate and
individual), $8.o; miscellaneous internal revenue, $3.8; social security taxes,
$1.2;customs,$.4. As these figures are not broken down for certain items in
the table, no new calculations of percentages are presented for 1942.TAXATION: NEEDS, ETC. 173
recent estimates of the probable yield during the fiscal years
1942 and iof the tax system as amended by the Revenue
Act of 1941.
The tax system on which the Revenue Act of 1941 was
superimposed has three major components: a group of cor-
poration taxes, a tax on net incomes of individuals, and the
so-called excises, which include a wide range of imposts on
the manufacture or sale of particular services and commodi-
ties, the most lucrative being taxes on liquor, tobacco, and
gasoline. Somewhat less lucrative are the special levies on
employers and employees, including those on railroad pay-
rolls, which are used to finance old age annuities and the
unemployment insurance portion of the social security legis-
lation, and are listed here as social security taxes. A relatively
minor role is played by estate and gift taxes on the one hand,
and customs duties, once the main bulwark of federal finance,
on the other.
The total collections realized in the fiscal year ended
June 1942 exceeded those obtained in the last year before the
war by nearly 14.4 per cent and those for the fiscal year 1941
by 72 per cent. The total expected for 1943 exceeds that for
1939 by over 220 per cent. These increases are partly ex-
plained by the rise in real national income and the advance
in prices. Both enlarge the base upon which the tax system
is imposed and hence add to the latter's yield. In addition,
revenues are being realized from changes effected by the sev-
eral revenue acts passed since the armament program was
commenced: the application of higher rates and smaller al-
lowances to existing taxes, and new levies, such as the tax
on excess profits imposed by the Second Revenue Act of 1940
and the excises introduced by the Revenue Act of 1941.
The consequences of these changes are not limited to the
increase in total tax collections. The percentage of total rev-
enue yielded by each main category listed has shifted some-
what, but the really spectacular changes have come in the
relative shares of the excises, and of the corporation and per-174 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
sonal income taxes. Excises are no longer the largest source
of federal revenue. That place has been taken by
taxes, which are laid chiefly on earnings. The personal in-
come tax, greatly inferior to excises as a source in 1939, will
in 1943, under the Revenue Act of 1941, clearly supersede
excises as having second place in the revenue system.
These latest developments should not, however, be con-
sidered alone. A longer view of the changing makeup of the
federal tax structure shows numerous important shifts in the
less recent past, some of which can be explained by changes
in economic conditions or other factors rather than solely by
changes in tax policy. Changes in tax policy with respect to
the objects of taxation, such as the specific commodities and
services and the incomes or legally specified parts of incomes
of individuals and corporations, and also to the rates and
other features of the tax law, do indeed bring shifts in the
contributions from various types of tax. But changing eco-
nomic conditions also account for such shifts. For example,
during the deep depression following the collapse of 1929,
individualand corporate incomes shrank so greatly that rev-
enue from taxes on them, despite higher rates, was much less
than in the immediately preceding years. Indeed, one of the
very reasons for greater reliance upon excises was that .public
revenues could not be adequately supplied by taxes on indi-
vidual and corporate incomes at any rates, high though they
seemed, that Congress was willing to impose. Moreover, an-
other factor not primarily involved in tax policy, influenced
the relative share of excises: with the repeal of prohibition
large revenues could be collected from excises on alcoholic
The most striking feature of the revenue structure
is its lack of stability: numerous and wide shifts characterize
the entire record, not merely the recent years covered in
'11Table
So far as these developments are due to changing tax pol-
icy, however, they are not being examined here on their
merits as revenue measures for a peacetime economy, butTAXATION: NEEDS, ETC. 175
with reference to a wartime situation the necessities of which
dominate all other considerations. The Act of 1941 raises at
once the basic question to which this section is directed: is
the federal tax system, as now constituted, adequate to the
15




Corporationtaxes 7.9 32.136.121.1 23.828.6
Individual income taxes 9.4 27.031.6i8.821.2 18.3
Above combined 70.755.7
Estate and gift taxes i.84.0 3.5i.8i.8 5.95.2
Excises 53.321.922.7 19.914.344.934.430.9
Customsb 29.45.617.617.516.213.4 9.5 5.1
Corporateand individual not segregated in 1920and1923officialreports.
bCustomsincludes 'tonnage' in all years shown except 1933and1937.
Includes also social security taxes, amounting to 5.2percent in 1937,11.9
percent in 1941.Datacompiled from Annual Reports, Secretary of the
Treasury.
twofold task of financing such reasonable proportion of total
expenditures, including the armament program, as must be
paid for by taxation if inflationary borrowing is to be avoided,
and of implementing other economic policies appropriate to
expanding armament production? The first task is concerned
with preventing inflation; the second includes as its main
sub-heads assistance in diverting resources from civilian to
military use, allocating small supplies of civilian goods among
consumers, and the leaving as a postwar legacy a minimum of
disorder in the economic structure.
With respect to the first task, the question may be an-
swered without equivocation in the negative. The tax system,
as amended by the Revenue Act of 1941 and including in-
come placed in trust funds, chiefly from social security taxes,
is expected to yield about $i8 billion in the fiscal year 1943.
If at least billion is regarded as having to be obtained176 FISCALPLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
by taxes in order that total borrowing shall not include infla-
tionary elements, a minimum shortage under the 1941 law of
approximately $22 billion is indicated.
The second and related part of the question is to be ap-
proachedby way of the requirements and the economic effects
of an armament program. As these have already been exam-
ined at length, a brief restatement suffices to establish the re-
lationship to taxation measures appropriate for implement-
ing the economic policies.
An armament program, especially under the drive of war,
requires a far-reaching and rapid reorganization of produc-
tive resources. Since the United States did not start the arma-
ment program in a period of optimum employment to re-
organize the economy for war has been somewhat easier.
Certain resources, uncommitted, so to speak, were shaped the
more readily to new undertakings; but, by the beginning of
1942, most of the slack had been taken up. As long as the war
lasts, national policy must be aimed not simply toward utiliz-
ing idle resources in the manufacture of munitions; resources
used for civilian production must be diverted on a huge scale.
Production of armament, soon expected to. absorb half of the
national income, has already diminished the supply of many
i consumer goods; and, as the program is enlarged, it will
trench still more on the things consumers use. Armament in
the quantities desired can now be had only by drastic reduc-
tion in civilian consumption. As pointed out in preceding
chapters, however, a general expansion of production, whether
for the things of war or of peace, brings with it an increase in
money incomes of individuals and enterprises. Thus the situ-
ation emerging from the transformation of our economy to
an armament basis poses the paradox of giving civilians more
(money and fewer goodsto spend it on. Unless civilian spend-
ing can be adequately curtailed, inflation is inevitable despite
such attempts at price control as may prove politically or
otherwise feasible.
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should provide means for transferring money income from
private hands to the Treasury, and to that extent prevent
inflation. Such transfer can be accomplished either by taxa-
tion or by borrowing; taxation has the advantage of leaving
no heritage of public debt, but other considerations may
favor partial reliance on borrowing (see Ch. 6, Sec. 9). The
tax system can be designed to assist also the transfer of re-
sources from civilian to armament production and the allo-
cation among consumers of any supply remaining for them.
By making the prices of things needed for military use higher,
thereby discouraging their consumption for civilian purposes,
it provides an allocation which, though defective—perhaps de-
cisively—in that it ignores the needs of consumers who cannot
pay higher prices, avoids or reduces the administratively diffi-
cult, costly, and annoying controls involved in detailed ra-
tioning.
Money for public purposes may be obtained by other
means, not all of which are inflationary, and the acquisition
of revenue by the government is not central to our analysis
of the functions of taxation. We emphasize instead taxation
as a means of preventing inflation and of facilitating arma-
ment production. That revenue will be realized from these
uses of taxation is not unwelcome; nor is the fact that this
revenue is free from the obligation of any future payment of
interest or principal. But the question of exercising proper
controls over the economy in the present situation goes be-
yond that of the government revenue requirements, and even
that of avoiding future burdens.
Defects
Attainmentof the first objective, to absorb civilian money
incomes in order to prevent inflationary price advances, is
hampered by two major defects and certain other shortcom-
ings in the federal revenue system, as revised by the Act of
1941. These major defects appear in the inadequate magni-
tude and delayed timing of the aggregate taxes imposed. The178 FISCALPLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
estimated tax revenue, $i8 billion for the fiscal year 1943,
falls far short of covering the part of governmental costs which
cannot be financed by such borrowing from civilians as can
be justified on certain recognized grounds of public policy.
That further non-inflationary borrowing may be feasible and
that it would reduce the occasion for absorbing civilian in-
comes by taxation are admitted; but no serious doubt can
exist that, even withthefeasible maximum of non-inflation-
ary borrowing, in which considerable reliance might be placed
upon compulsory loans, the income remaining that should
be absorbed by taxes would greatly exceed $i8 billion.
The defect in timing arises because of the long interval
customarily elapsing between the receipt of civilian inconies
and the payment of taxes: from the present tax system rev-
kenueis for the most part delayed. Personal and corporate
income taxes, which together supply about 65 per cent of
total federal revenue estimated for the fiscal year 1943 under
the present law, are not collected currently. The 'return filed
on March 15 reports income received during the preceding
calendar year, but only one-fourth of the tax has to be paid at
that date. The remainder may be paid in three installments,
the last on December 15.' Estate and gift taxes, especially the
estate tax, are also subject to long delay. The portion of the
unemployment insurance tax that is collected by the federal
government, about io per cent of total collections of this tax,
is due a month after the close of the calendar year and may
be paid in installments.2 Excises, the old age annuity tax, and
customs alone are paid currently.
Taxes are commonly paid with money which would other-
wise support increased demands in the market.3 But if tax
payments are to function in preventing inflation, they should
be made currently as purchasing power is received by the
taxpayers. The anti-inflationary objective will not be realized
if individuals and corporations retain their entire incomes
for months. Long before these incomes are to be reported for
taxation, and still more months before the tax must be paidTAXATION: NEEDS, ETC. 179
in full, the money, except such as had not only been set aside
in reserves for taxes but held idle or invested in federal se-
curities pending tax payment, will have been spent or in-
vested and consequently will already have affected prices. Be-
sides, in a period of rising prices, the payment in any given
year, being based on the income realized in the preceding
year at a lower level of prices, will generally be smaller in
relation to income and prices current in the year of tax pay-
ment than to income and prices in the period in which the
income was earned. On the other hand, persons and business
firms whose incomes do not respond to the rising level of
prices will be discriminated against in that their tax pay-
ments will be relatively heavier in comparison with income
in the year of tax payment.
The present federal system of taxation, because personal
and corporation taxes predominate, also suffers because rate
and other changes cannot easily be effected more frequently
than annually; and this is an additional defect from the view-
point of inflation control. These taxes are based on the con-
cept of annual income. Consequently changes in rates, and
other factors determining the amount of tax, apply to income
defined on a twelve-month basis. But the armament program
is rapidly expanding, as is the flow of public money to indi-
viduals and business enterprises. Already the estimates of
what the nation will accomplish during the fiscal year 1943
have been boosted significantly. Expenditures for weapons
and war supplies will be increasing all through the fiscal year
1943, and probably during the next year, if not still longer.
These increasing additions to money incomes may afford
strong reason for introducing higher rates on personal and
corporation incomes at intervals of less than a year. Yet that
cannot be done under present arrangements, with various
elements in the tax system so designed that tax liability can
be determined satisfactorily only on an annual basis.
These defects in the federal tax system are not surprising.
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during many years and were intended neither separately nor
collectively to perform the economic tasks implicit in a great
armament program. Moreover, the tax system is largely a
legacy from a period in which tax policy was designed to re-
duce saving and stimulate consumption, not to absorb the
sort of money incomes being created or notably expanded by
the war. The outlines of our appraisal of war tax measures
are therefore traced by these deficiencies in the revenue sys-.
tern as it stands after thealterationsmade by the Revenue
Act of 1941. We shall discuss changes that will tend to check
inflation and that will facilitate accomplishment of the other
economic objectives recognized as desirable under present
circumstances. The changes relate mainly to types of tax al-
ready included in the system—changes in the specification of
the object taxed, in rates, in allowances and ameliorations
which reduce the tax levied, and in the manner of collection.
Certain other changes are to be considered—changes involv-
ing types of tax entirely or largely absent from the -existing
tax system. Not numerous, these include such items as a gen-
eral sales tax, a tax on gross incomes of individuals or enter-
prises, a tax on property of the capital levy type, a levy of the
forced-loan type which has characteristics of both taxation
and borrowing. The very fact that these types of tax have
little or no place in the existing system does not mean that
they have never been suggested or considered, but iniplies
rather that strong arguments against them have been recog-
nized. In wartime, fiscal needs are, however, so vast that even
questions that have been treated as closed may have to be
reopened.
2 LIMITING FACTORS ON TAX POLICY
Once the vast needs for taxation in wartime and the inade-
quacy of the present system to meet those needs are recog-
nized, devising a tax program means choosing a combination
of some new taxes or changes in existing taxes. Several com-
binations would meet or largely meet the basic wartime eco-TAXATION: NEEDS, ETC. i8i
nomic objectives of diverting resources to military use and
preventing inflation. Choice among the combinations, such a
choice as in fact the government must and will make, is sub-
ject in greater or less degree to highly important and some-
what imponderable limiting factors.
One limitation arises because the needs to be met, in re-
spect of both diversion of resources and prevention of infla-
tion, are complex and specific rather than simple and general.
While a general need exists for reducing civilian consump-
tion to release resources for military use, and accordingly taxes
that restrict such consumption in a general way do contribute
to a wartime economic need, a much more effective contribu-
tion will be realized by applying taxes that restrict the par-
ticular kinds of consumption most likely to compete with the
military use of resources. Likewise, though a general need
exists for absorbing civilian incomes in order to prevent in-
flation, and accordingly any taxes—for all taxes, with negli-
gible reservations, absorb civilian income—contribute to that
need, a much more effective contribution will be realized by
applying taxes which absorb income at such points in the
economic system or in the hands of such individuals that its
capacity to induce inflation is most serious. Chapters 2 and
3 outline theconditions which roughly determine the specific
needs, as against the general need, and accordingly imply
certain broad limitations on the combinations of taxes that
will serve the basic objectives.
One set of limitations is essentially 'mechanical,' and re-
flects the direct conflict of one type of tax with another. Any
one tax measure might yield large revenue and absorb much
purchasing power if it alone were adopted, but might lose
much of this effect if certain other measures also were adopted.
The one tax might largely absorb or remove the income se-
lected as the base for the other tax.
The other chief limiting factors fall into two categories.
The more significant, from the viewpoint of this book, in-
cludes limitations imposed on the official choice of tax meas-182 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
ures by the danger of impairing private incentives essential
to the most effective war effort. Almost any tax measure may
damage private incentives, although some are far less detri-
mental than others or affect incentives less essential than oth-
ers to the war effort. Wise formulation of tax policy requires
the appraisal, however difficult, of the effects various meas-
ures separately and in combination will have on incentives, and
a choice of measures that will minimize the total damage and
distribute it in a manner least likely to impede the war effort.
The second category of limitations covers all resistances to the
imposition of specific taxes that reflect purely private inter-
ests—of groups of citizens or enterprises, and also of legislators
and other government officials responsible for tax policy.
These two categories, of the psychological or political sort,
have large influence in framing tax policy. The psychological
limitations are discussed at various points in ensuing chapters,
where they have special pertinence; but, for reasons set forth
in the Preface, the political limitations are not discussed spe-
cifically in this book.
3 POSSIBLE COMBINED TAX PLANS
The significant elements out of which a tax plan designed
to raise additional revenue and contribute to other wartime
economic objectives can be developed are discussed in Chap-
ters 8-12. We do not trytoestablish the wisdom of applying
any one element with maximum, or any other degree of
severity. Instead we undertake to show the main economic
implications of each major tax device, and to suggest the
revenue to be realized if it is applied in a specified way and
with specified severity. Both the revenue and the other eco-
nomic effects of applying any one tax device are conditioned
by the degree of application of some of or all the other devices.
The structure of the tax program as a whole becomes in a
sense the key to the revenue potentiality and the economic
effects of any one element.
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consider various combinations of the elements, each element
applied with various degrees of severity. The total revenue
from any one such program must be calculated with an eye
to the effects of one tax device on the revenue yield of others.
The economic effects of the combination, especially in terms
of the diversion of resources from civilian to military use and
of preventing inflation, must be considered as a whole, with
attention to the extent to which various elements of the com-
bination supplement or conflict with one another. Moreover,
the taxing authority will consider the various combinations
in terms of the policy aspects, mainly psychological or politi-
cal, that in the main do not admit of analysis on the basis of
statistical or other economic facts. It will in fact select among
the possible combinations, and the official tax program so se-
lected will be determined by considerations partly of the
revenue and other economic effects and partly of the policy
issues mentioned above.
We do not present here any combination of tax devices to
be regarded as a suggested tax program. We exhibit instead
in Table i6 three combinations selected to illustrate possi-
bilities. Comparison among them is intended to show that
more severe application of one tax device may require less
severe application of another. We emphasize that many other
combinations could be drawn up, that several others might
conceivably meet more satisfactorily the needs of the situa-
tion, and that policy and other considerations may easily lead
the government to adopt a program differing significantly
from any combination here shown.
The first combination differs from the others in that it
includes no sales tax and applies a heavier tax on individual
income. The third combination differs from the others in
that it applies less heavy corporate taxes and includes a fairly
heavy general sales tax.
To combat inflation currently, such a stoppage-at-the-source
device as is described in Chapter i 1 may be a suitable part of
all three combinations; but it would probably be less urgently184 FISCALPLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
needed or would not have to be used so drastically in the
third, which includes a heavy sales tax, than in the first,
which includes no sales tax.
Each combination presented shows an additional revenue,
based our somewhat rough estimates, of not over $12
billion. Accordingly, any of these combinations, when super-
imposed upon the tax structure existing under the Act of
TABLE i6
Estimated Additional Revenues, for a Full Year,
from Selected Combinations of Changes in the Act of 1941
Combination i BILLIONS
OF DOLLARS
a) Very severe advances in corporate tax rates (average rates: nor-
mal, 24; surtax, excess profits, 75) 3.2
b) Higher rates & wider commodity list, for selective excises, but
no general sales tax i.6
c)Severe advances in rate (up to a level of 30% for lowest
bracket), & reductions in personal allowancesin other amel-
iorations of the individual income tax 4.5
d) Higher rates Sc extension in coverage of social security taxes 2.0
e) Higher rates Sc lower exemptions, for estate & gift taxes
Total ii.8
Combination 2
a) Corporations as in (i) 3.2
b) Selective excises as in (t), but a moderate (3%) general (with
few exclusions, such as food Sc low-priced clothing) sales tax 2.8
c)Less severe advances in rates (up to a level of 20% for lowest
bracket); other changes in individual income tax as in (1) 3.5
d) Social security taxes as in (i) 2.0
e) Estate & gift taxes as in (i) .5
Total 12.0
Combination 3
a) Less severe advances in corporate rates (average rates: normal,
24; surtax, excess profits, 70) 2.1
b) Selective excises as in (i), but a more severe sales tax
than in (2) 3•5
c)Rate advances Sc other changes as in (2), for individual income
tax (with allowance for greater dividend payments) 3.7
d) Social security taxes as in (i) 2.0
e) Estate & gift taxes as in (i) .5
Total ii.8TAXATION: NEEDS, ETC. 185
1941,would bring total revenues only to about $30 billion.
This is $io billion short of the tax goal of $40 billion iridi-
cated earlier in this chapter as a rough minimum if borrow-
ing is to be kept within such bounds that serious risks of
inflationary consequences will not be incurred. Any com-
bination of new taxes which would cut down this dangerous
gap of $io billion would necessarily comprise even more
severe rates than those illustrated in Table i6.
N OTES
1 A similar arrangement delays the payment of taxes by individuals and cor-
porations operating on a fiscal year (other than the calendar year) basis. Few
individuals, but many corporations, use the fiscal year in reporting for taxes.
2 The federal-state arrangement whereby state unemployment insurance taxes
are levied and, through the medium of a trust fund, contribute money for
current federal expenditures is described in Ch. 12.
3 Some tax payments are made with idle money, which, being unused other-
wise, does not add to the demand for goods while in private possession,
although the holders may at any time put the money into active use in the
markets. Transferred to the Treasury, however, money from this source may
function on the demand side of the market and therefore as a price-raising
influence.